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I.

Abstract
In recent years, a debate has arisen about a controversial method of warfare – refugees

and migrants who are exploited in multi-dimensional conflicts and humanitarian crises by state
actors. The notion of ‘weapons of mass migration’, or a deliberate use of refugees and migrants
as leverage against other nation-states, became one of the most prominent yet underappreciated
theories in academic literature. But who actually availed themselves of the “weapons of mass
migration” during the European migrant crisis, and how does migration fit into the realm of
international relations today? My thesis aims to provide a detailed examination of the alleged
weaponization of refugees and migrants practiced by Russia and Belarus during the 2015-16
European migrant crisis and the 2021-22 Belarus-European Union border crisis, respectively.
The main factors analyzed include 1) the historical background of Russia and Belarus relations
with the European Union (EU); 2) the different types of measures that the Russian and
Belarusian government both relied on when weaponizing refugees and migrants; 3) to what
extent did the “weapons of mass migration” affect the political developments in Europe; and 4)
how successful Russia and Belarus were in doing so. In analyzing these factors, the paper
concludes that ‘weapons of mass migration’ do exist. As in the case studies, migrants and
refugees were created, manipulated, and exploited by these two regimes.
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II.

Introduction
Forced or involuntary migration has become a severe global issue in the twenty-first

century. The number of persons compelled to escape their homes owing to human rights
violations, persecution, and other reasons that breach international law has risen considerably in
recent years all over the world. The vast majority of those people are either labeled as refugees or
asylum seekers. According to the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugee, a
refugee is a “person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of a
‘well-founded fear of persecution’ due to reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.”1 Supported by the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and reinforced by the 1967 Protocol, this treaty considers refugees as people who
have no choice but to flee from their home countries and across international borders as an
attempt to resettle in another country.
Based on the 1951 Convention, the definition of forced displacement has been interpreted
differently by governments, NGOs, and other international organizations. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM), for example, defines forced displacement as a phenomenon
whereby people are trying to "escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made
disasters, ecological degradation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom or
livelihood"2. UNESCO similarly defines the term as "the forced movement of people from their
locality or environment and occupational activities.3 Out of all the main causes of displacement,
conflicts stand on top of the list. Typically, conflict-induced displacement refers to instances in
which people are forced to evacuate their homes due to political violence, such as civil wars,
“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Accessed November 7, 2021. https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.
2
"What is forced migration? — Forced Migration Online''. www.forced migration.org. Archived from the original
on 2017-08-01. Retrieved 2017-01-17.
3
"Displaced Person / Displacement | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization".
www.unesco.org. Retrieved 2019-10-24.
1
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ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and/or other violations of ther human rights. Most conflict-induced
displacement in the 21st century has occurred in war-torn countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East. A contemporary case study is the Syrian Civil War (which started on
March 15, 2011). In the wake of the civil war, some 13.5 million Syrian migrants and asylum
seekers have flooded to Europe, creating a humanitarian crisis as a result.4
One often unrecognized factor that helps to define a conflict-induced displacement
remains to be unexplored: the involvement foreign of foreign regional and international state
actors. But given how the most common causes of forced displacement primarily revolve around
the migrants and refugees themselves, such as economic, environmental, social and political
factors, it's all too simple to think that forced displacement is an inevitable result of conflict.
Forced displacement, in actuality, is a subtle if unethical means to an end — one founded as a
subsequent result of a sovereign nation’s political decisions, frequently for specific political
and/or economic ends.5 In doing so, nation-states can avoid direct confrontation with others
while progressing their agenda. Hence migration can actually be engineered and exploited by
external nation-states in order to serve their own economic and political interests.
Much of the scholarly research into the European migrant crisis so far merely focuses on
the successes and failures of the European Union’s response to the migrant crisis. But trying to
study the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis is a limited scope of analysis, and will not
lead to a more useful understanding of how forced displacement not only affects the politics of
nation-states, but their relations with other nations. The relevant literature on refugee politics has
yet to investigate how forced migration impacts host state conduct and what this means for other

4

“Global Trends - Forced Displacement in 2015.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
2015. https://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf.
5
Greenhill, Kelly M. “Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion.” Strategic
Insights 9, no. 1 (2010).
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state actors whose major purpose in the international arena is to further their national interests
and influence. These limited inquiries will be answered by applying the theory of “weapons of
mass migration” in the case studies of Russia and Belarus in order to further explain how this
phenomenon does exist in the 21st century.
First, I compiled existing research related to the “weapons of mass migration”, which
serves as the foundation of the thesis. Then, I will examine Russia and Belarus to provide insight
into the development and trajectory of their foreign policy, and how to interpret it through the
alleged use of ‘weapons of mass migration’. Each case study presents the historical context of
their relations with the European Union and the strategy they have used to weaponize mass
migration movements. In conclusion, I argue that both Russia and Belarus are facilitating the
migrant flows by means of unconventional methods in an attempt to undermine their European
counterparts in the short-run while advancing their (geo-)political interests in the long-run.
III.

Methodology and Limitations

A. Importance of case studies chosen – Significance
The comparative analysis of Russia and Belarus within the context of the European
migrant crisis will provide insight as to whether, how and why they utilized “weapons of mass
migration.” The Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus are important actors in the
international realm, due to their status as authoritarian countries who possess tense relations with
the European Union. These two countries – one under the impetus of Russian president Vladimir
Putin and the other under Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko – also share a common
foreign policy of enhancing their (geo-)political influence across Europe. Both regimes have
employed a shared doctrine of “weapons of mass migration”, although the two countries have
used this weapon on different schedules. Whereas Russia has been accused by the European
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Union of weaponizing refugees and migrants as far as back as the 2015-16 European migrant
crisis, Belarus has been only recently accused by Poland, Lithuania and Latvia of doing the same
since July 2021. As seen, these two nations are similar in many factors, yet the final outcome, its
geo-political interests shifting towards the EU, is very different between the two. By selecting
these two countries, I will try to evaluate the correlation of their use of the weapon and their
foreign policies, as well as the implications it may have on the European Union.
B. Method/organization of the paper
This paper will first outline previous scholarly work on different interpretations of the
“weapons of mass migration”, which provides context of Russia and Belarus’ involvement in the
EU migrant crisis and their alleged exploitation of the mass migration movement. In the
literature review, I propose that Russia and Belarus are indeed weaponizing refugees by using the
apparent threat of a refugee crisis as a way to destabilize its European neighbors while gradually
advancing their geopolitical interests. I will then discuss the Russian and Belarussian case
studies. For each country, historical overviews, relations with the European Union, methods of
weaponizing refugees, and their impact on the European Union will be outlined. Next, the
analysis section will review the case studies and suggest some alternative perspectives that either
support or contradict the existing research on my topic. Finally, my conclusion will summarize
the arguments discussed and outline future questions to be researched in the 21st century-based
field of European comparative politics and migration studies.
C. Limitations
The limitations of my thesis pertain to the difficulty in gathering concrete evidence that
both Russia and Belarus are indeed weaponizing refugees against the EU. Both Russia and
Belarus possess state-owned media, obstruct journalistic enquiry through widespread arrests and
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threats, and actively limit access to information. In fact, most of the accusations of using
“weapons of mass migration” are reported by the West, and hence can be ignored by the accused.
In Russia’s case, most of the primary sources about the Kremlin’s alleged “weapons of mass
migrations” mainly originate from Western European sources not limited to government
publications, reports, newspapers, and scholarly articles. In the case of Belarus, these allegations
have been recently brought up in the past couple of months since July 2021. Thus, most of the
evidence about Belarus originates from Western secondary sources. Finally, this paper does not
focus on the humanitarian aspect of the migrant crisis, as these events are not merely about
migration. Overall, these are limits to the creation of a complete portrait of the concept at hand in
regard to whether they utilize “weapons of mass migration.”
IV.

Literature Review
To begin, it is important to first understand where the ‘weapons of mass migration’ come

from. Myron Weiner (1993) and Michael Teitelbaum (1984) were the first scholars to challenge
this theory by suggesting that population movements can be treated as a political means to
political and military ends by nation-states. Both scholars also saw population movements as a
potential security threat to the internal stability of countries who are on the receiving end.6
Despite the fact that they introduced this phenomenon, the majority of International Relations
scholars typically define migrants and refugees as nothing more than natural products of political
violence. Teitelbaum even remarked in his own words how “the most striking weakness in
migration theories drawn from the social sciences is their failure to detail in a serious way with
government action in initiating, selecting, restraining, and ending migration movements.”7

6

Weiner, Myron. (1995) The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and Human Rights. New York:
Addison-Wesley
7
Teitelbaum, Michael S. (2001) “International Migration: Predicting the Unknowable,” in Myron Weiner and
Sharon Stanton Russell (eds.), Demography and National Security. New York: Russell Sage
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James Hollifield (2000) and Robert Mandel (1997) also offered a theoretical explanation
of migration movements by analyzing its security implications on receiving nations. Hollifield
conceived and formulated a conclusion that forced displacement of migrants and refugees can be
exploited for self-interest. By forcing migration into receiving states, they inflict a security
threat. Supporting Hollifield’s theoretical argument, Mandel highlighted some of the following
causes of refugee-related perceived security threats: political instability, civil conflict/ethnic
conflict, economic opportunity, environmental degradation/natural disaster and great foreign
power rivalries and interventionist policies.8 He also explained how this phenomena underlines
the flaws of the modern nation-state while also questioning the future consequences of how
migration will be treated in a globalized world. The main limitation of this research, however, is
the lack of contemporary case studies to support this argument.
In her book, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign
Policy, Kelly Greenhill (2010) offered a fresh perspective of migration by outlining different
ways in which refugees and migrants have been weaponized by states in the post-World War II
era.9 Building on Weiner’s and Teitelbaum’s work, she labeled this phenomenon as strategically
engineered migration – “out-migrations that are deliberately induced or manipulated by state or
non-state actors, in ways designed to augment, reduce, or change the composition of the
population residing within a particular territory, for political, economic or military ends.”10
Although Greenhill has expanded on Teitelbaum’s and Weiner’s original work, she outlined
seven different variants of strategically engineered migration which will be better explained in
the theoretical framework. Christopher C Joyner (2006) also describes how a nation can exploit

8

Mandel, Robert (1997) “Perceived Security Threat and the Global Refugee Crisis,” Armed Forces and Society 24,
no. 1: 77–103.
9
Ibid.
10
Greenhill, Kelly M. (2008) “Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War,” Civil Wars vol. 10. no. 1.
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migration in order to induce the political behavior of another state actor through the use of
pressure, threats, and intimidation, and conventional military means.11 But unlike Joyner,
Greenhill explains how states can also use nonmilitary means to weaponize migrants.
Furthemore, her research breaks down the concept of “weapons of mass migration” by
highlighting different types of nation-states who exercise strategically engineered migration:
generators, agents provocateurs, and opportunists.12 In this thesis, both Russia and Belarus are
best seen as generators, or states who indirectly create the mass influx of refugees by any other
means besides military involvement.13 As so-called generators, Russia and Belarus attempt to
dissuade other target states from acting accordingly to their migration policies by relying on
unconventional mechanisms. The first one is power-base erosion, which focuses on using
migration to impose negative implications on the incumbent government’s relations with its
citizens. The second one is unrest, similar to the first mechanism, relies on targeting certain
nations with messages highlighting existing domestic problems with migration that they created
in the first place. Next is decapitation, or threatening its leadership’s sovereignty and national
security. The fourth mechanism is weakening, which uses migration to induce social, political
and economic problems within the country. And last but not least, denial is used as a coping
mechanism for countries such as Russia and Belarus who sought to gain political victories
without necessarily inciting direct confrontation.14 According to this viewpoint, both countries
made use of these mechanisms in order to alter the behavior of the European Union, their target.
Greenhill also recognizes a pattern whereby authoritarian regimes specifically target
advanced liberal democracies. A key point is that advanced liberal democracies are likely to
11

Joyner, Christopher C. “Coercion.” Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, December 2006.
Greenhill, Kelly M. “Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion.” Strategic
Insights 9, no. 1 (2010).
13
Ibid.
14
Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 50.
12
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succumb to strategically engineered migration for several reasons, each of which challenges the
norms of the European Union with regard to refugee-related issues.15 Before Greenhill, Sandra
Lavanex (2010) and James Hollfield (1992) claimed how liberal democracies such as the EU
asserted a mandate regarding refugee protection, as evident in the EU's commitments toward the
1948 Human Rights Declaration, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol during the Cold
War.16 These commitments were interpreted as a sign of good faith that the democratic systems
of the West would ensure refugee protection far more effectively than the communist regimes.17
Florian Trauner (2016), on the contrary, offers a frightening interpretation of this circumstance.
He concludes that the EU’s strategy of containing refugees might have negative consequences in
the future. These commitments gradually put pressure on the EU’s responsibility to adhere to
them without having a say in revising the mandate18 This exemplifies the widening gap between
claimed commitments and real political practice. Trauner also points out how the actual flaws of
the EU asylum policy-making system can trigger or exacerbate conflicts both within states and
between them.19 Opposition parties within these member states would treat such circumstances
as strong incentives to criticize the flaws of the current administrations’ policy to accept refugees
no matter the cost – hence in many cases the emergence of polarization and anti-European
sentiments.20 By making the EU look ineffective and disunified, such a crisis can provide an
opportunity for external nations to take advantage of its weaknesses because they know that the
union will sometimes impose the costs of hypocrisy. In my case studies, I wish to explore where
15

Greenhill, Kelly M. “Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion.” Strategic
Insights 9, no. 1 (2010).
16
James Hollifield, “Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European Community,”
International Migration Review 26 (1992): 568-95.
17
Lavenex, S. 2001. The Europeanization of refugee policies: normative challenges and institutional legacies.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 5: 851–74.10.1111/jcms.2001.39.issue-5
18
Florian Trauner (2016) Asylum policy: the EU’s ‘crises’ and the looming policy regime failure, Journal of
European Integration, 38:3, 311-325, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1140756
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
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and how the EU’s vulnerability during the refugee crisis turned beneficial for authoritarian
regimes such as Russia and Belarus.
V.

Theoretical Framework
In order to thoroughly examine and understand Russia's and Belarus' use of “weapons of

mass migrations”, we must employ a comprehensive taxonomy that includes seven variants of
strategic engineered migration (as shown in Figure 1).21 Based on Greenhill’s past work, some of
these types are comparable to asymmetric warfare in which governments and non-state entities
try to influence or undermine their adversaries using unorthodox tactics. All of them will be
further reviewed in the analysis section to confirm Russia's and Belarus's weaponization of
migrants/refugees. However, because migrant movements may compromise many goals and
aims, several of the following seven variables might be exercised by Russia and Belarus.
As shown in Figure 1, the first of the seven variants is coercive engineered migration, or
cross-border population migrations that are purposefully manufactured by countries in order to
persuade a target state to make certain political, military, or economic concessions.22 The second
variant is dispossessory whereby a country takes advantage of migration flows in order to take
territories or natural resources from the target group to where migrants are fleeing. The third
variant is exportive whereby a country seeks to politically undermine a rival power. The variant
is economic migration, which describes when a country makes monetary gains by exploiting the
migration outflow. The fifth column, which differs from dispositive, focuses more on weakening
a target government by directly sending migrants to its territory. The sixth variant is militarized
whereby a country can sabotage enemy activities or reduce military support by dispatching
migrants to their territories so that the enemy is more concerned with the humanitarian response.
21

Greenhill, Kelly M. (March 2008). "Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War". Civil Wars. 10 (1): 8.
doi:10.1080/13698240701835425. S2CID 145215754. Retrieved 20 August 2019.
22
Ibid.
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Figure 1: Seven Categories of Weaponized Migration, as presented in Kelly Greenhill’s "Strategic Engineered
Migration as a Weapon of War"

And last but not least, the seventh variant revolves around migration-related propaganda which
countries can use to strengthen their perceived legitimacy on a regional or worldwide level while
weakening their adversaries’ in the process.
VI.

Case Studies

Russia
I.

Russia’s Motivations: Putin's restoration of a lost empire
Russia has undergone two large implosions in the past century: the collapse of the former

Russian Empire during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the dissolution of the USSR in
1991. Even though the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a new age for Russia, the country now
found itself at the mercy of sheer Western dominance. This event shaped the geo-political agenda
of Vladimir Putin. In his own words, he termed the fall of the USSR as “a major geopolitical
disaster of the 20th century” in his address at the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on
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April 25, 2005.23 More than a mere mourning of a once powerful communist state, Putin’s
declaration can be seen in light of his desire to regain territories that the Russian Federation has
initially lost and to reclaim its former imperial glory. He also sought to halt the advances of the
West through Eastern Europe and formerly Soviet republics.24
To fulfill its geo-political agenda under the principle of the restoration of imperial glory,
Moscow is waging two campaigns across the former Soviet Union: expanding its political,
economic, and military clout; and countering Western and transatlantic institutions..25 These
objectives first took place in 1990 when the Eastern Bloc satellites started to abandon Russia and
joined NATO. East Germany reunited with the Federal Republic of Germany and became part of
NATO, followed by Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.26 Putin initially acknowledged
NATO, going as far as not ruling out the possibility of Russia joining the alliance.27 NATO
responded by establishing the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 in which NATO reassured the
Russian Federation that it would continue to uphold its promise made during the 1990
negotiations between Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev, of not expanding “not one inch
eastward”.28 Promises were made but not honored, according to Putin.
It became clear when seven more Eastern Bloc countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – joined NATO, later followed by Albania, Croatia,
and Montenegro.29 Russia considers the former Soviet republics, Eatern Europe and the Balkans
23

Osborn, Andrew. “Putin: Collapse of the Soviet Union Was 'Catastrophe of the Century'.” The Independent.
Independent Digital News and Media, April 25, 2005.
24
Dawisha, Karen. “Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?” New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014.
25
Stronski, Paul, and Richard Sokolsky. “The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2017.
26
Adomelt, Hannes. “Gorbachev's Consent to Unified Germany's Membership in NATO.” German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, December 2006. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvx8b7c5.14.
27
Frost, David. “BBC Breakfast with Frost: Interview with Vladimir Putin.” BBC News, March 5, 2000.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/breakfast_with_frost/transcripts/putin5.mar.txt.
28
Sarotte, Mary Elise. “A Broken Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion.” Foreign
Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 90–97.
29
“Member Countries,” NATO, last updated: March 26, 2018.
https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_52044.htm.
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to fall under their sphere of influence. So it was with great concern that they watched Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia not
only joined NATO, but some of them acceded to EU membership in 2004.30 The line was
eventually drawn once the European Union and NATO began to negotiate membership with
Ukraine, Russia’s most prized possession. This, combined with the incorporation of former
Soviet satellites into the EU in spite of assurances to the contrary, was seen by the Kremlin as a
challenge to its power. Russia was even more determined to prevent other neighboring countries
from aligning with the West, and in the process, preserve its sphere of influence.
To do so, the Kremlin used every weapon at its disposition to influence both the public
and political elites alike in Eastern European countries.31 This included diplomatic and cyber
intelligence efforts, as well as economic and trade incentives and flexing their military muscle.
Political sociologist Larry Diamond notes that Putin's well-planned campaign included the
invasion of Georgia (2008); attempts to include the former Soviet republics, such as Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, in the Eurasian Economic Union; a successful attempt to
have formerly Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to refuse signing the Association
Agreements (2014); invasions and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol the same year, followed
by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict which continues to this day.32
Despite tremendous progress in these areas, there have been setbacks in Moscow’s
efforts. All of which, without surprise, involved renewed conflict with the European Union.
Consequently, these actions changed Russia’s status as a strategic “partner” to a strategic
“challenge”. The EU condemned Moscow’s attempts to further expand its sphere of influence in
30

Ivanica, Madalina. (2003) An Overview of the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia to the European Union. EIPA Working Paper 03/W/03.
31
Stronski, Paul, and Richard Sokolsky. “The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2017.
32
Diamond, Larry (2016-12-09). "Russia and the Threat to Liberal Democracy". The Atlantic. Retrieved
2021-03-06.
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these countries as it violated the principle of rules-based international order which specifies that
nations ought to respect the territorial integrity and independence of countries such as Ukraine.33
On March 20, 2014, the EU took action by imposing economic and financial sanctions on
Russian officials, banks, and businesses.34
II.

Russia’s Objectives: 2015-16 European Migrant Crisis
The European migrant crisis of 2015-16 saw an upsurge in the movement of refugees and

migrants fleeing political violence from the Middle East and Africa, with a record 1.3 million
migrants seeking asylum in EU countries.35 The main catalyst to this crisis was the ongoing
Syrian Civil War, which began right after the Arab Spring protests of March 2011, and then
escalated into a civil war between the Syrian government and anti-government rebel groups.36 As
shown in Figure 2, the civil war was backed by Russia and Iran who allied themselves with the
Syrian government and by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and others who allied with
the rebels.37 As of December 2015, an influx of 600,000 million people have been displaced to
the European Union, primarily to Germany, due to the multi-faceted conflict.38
As such, the migration crisis instantly posed a major challenge to the European Union.
One might ask whether the migration flows to Europe could be part of Russia’s strategy of
“strategic engineered migration” in order to weaken the European Union, if not, some of the EU
member states. The United States and the EU both suspected that Russia was deliberately
33

Stronski, Paul, and Richard Sokolsky. “The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2017.
34
"Russia’s rouble crisis poses threat to nine countries relying on remittances Archived 9 December 2016 at the
Wayback Machine ". The Guardian. 18 January 2015.
35
“Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts.” BBC News. BBC, March 4, 2016.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.
36
Yacoubian, M. “Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad”. United States Institute of Peace. January 1,
2021
37
Beltyukova, Anastasia, and Henrik Pettersson. "The Free-for-all in Syria Will Make Your Head Spin." April 11,
2018. https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/25/middleeast/syria-isis-whos-fighting-who-trnd/index.html.
38
“2015: The Year of Europe's Refugee Crisis.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html.
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Figure 2: CNN Reporting of Foreign Involvement in Syrian War (Updated January 22, 2018)

manipulating and exploiting Europe’s migration crisis.39 While the accusations have remained to
be denied or downplayed by the Kremlin, there is evidence that Russia has leveraged the refugee
crisis over the union’s weakness.40 The Kremlins’ main objectives were to destabilize the
European Union in retaliation for the 2014 sanctions; and to spread its sphere of influence across
selected EU member states that are of high priority to Russia.
III.

How Migration is Weaponized by the Putin Regime
Such Russian objectives are fulfilled through Moscow’s use of “active measures”, a term

first used by the USSR to describe covert subversive operations.41 The Russian regime is trying
to combat the European Union by applying these active measures which are used as a substitute
for a direct act of war. These include propaganda and information operations, disinformation,
deception, sabotage, and cyberattacks, along with (un-)conventional military operations.42 The
39

“Migrant Crisis: Russia and Syria 'Weaponizing' Migration.” BBC News. BBC, March 2, 2016.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35706238.
40
Schoemaker, Hans. “Allegations of Russian Weaponized Migration Against the EU.” Militaire Spectator, July 26,
2019.
41
Galeotti, Mark. “Active Measures: Russia’s Covert Geopolitical Operations.” George C. Marshall European
Center For Security Studies, June 2019.
42
Pettyjohn, Stacie L. and Becca Wasser, Competing in the Gray Zone: Russian Tactics and Western Responses.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019.
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most recent case where Moscow utilized this covert form of warfare was 2014, the year Russia
invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea.43 While the Russian government did not acknowledge its
offensives in Ukraine, the fact remains that they used active measures, the same ones employed
in the 2015-16 European migration crisis albeit in a different manner. The main distinction is that
the Putin regime utilized these active measures by treating migrants as a foundation under the
guise of fulfilling its political agenda of undermining the EU. These measures include:
a. (Un-)Conventional Military Forces
In September 2015, Putin declared that he would intervene in Syria at the request of
Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.44 As a result of the increasing presence of ISIS in Syria, the
United Nations Security Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 2249, which called for "all
necessary measures" to prevent and repress "terrorist activities on territory under [ISIS's] control
in Syria and Iraq by Member States with the appropriate competence."45 In November, Russia
began to carry out extensive airstrikes across the country. Despite Russia's assertions that their
bombings in Syria are legal and sanctioned by UNSRC 2249 as part of the war against terrorism,
the West has slammed the Kremlin for intentionally targeting civilians. As a member of the UN
Security Council and as a signatory, Russia was expected to follow international humanitarian
law, which mandates governments to use specific tactics of combat to avoid endangering
civilians and civilian property.46 The 1977 Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
43

Abrams, Steve. “Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia.” Connections 15, no. 1 (2016):
5–31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26326426.
44
Segall, M. (2019). The Rocky Marriage of Convenience between Russia and Iran in Syria. Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs, January, 29.
45
46

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) IHL Databases, ““Rules of International Humanitarian Law and
Other Rules Relating to the Conduct of Hostilities,” accessed 2005.
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of the Child are among the other treaties to which Russia has agreed.47 Under the terms of the
agreements, Moscow is barred from using specific weapons and fighting practices that might
result in "accidental or excessive loss of civilian life, injury, damage, or displacement."48 And
airstrikes happen to be one of those weapons. However, Russia failed to comply with such laws
in practice. On March 1, 2016, General Philip Breedlove, former Commander of US European
Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander, testified:
‘… I am seeing in Syria in places like Aleppo and others […] what I would call
absolutely indiscriminate, unprecise bombing rubblizing (sic) major portions of a city. That does
not appear to be -- to me to be against any specific military target because the weapons they’re
using have no capability of hitting specific targets. They are unguided dumb weapons. And what
I have seen in the Assad regime from the beginning when they started using barrel bombs which
have absolutely no military utility. They are unguided and crude and what are they designed to
do (sic) is terrorize the public and get them on the road…. Designed to get people on the road
and make them someone else’s problem. Get them on the road, make them a problem for Europe
to bend Europe to the will of where they want them to be.’49
His comment refers to the Russian bombing campaign in Aleppo where the Russian Air
Forces carried out bombings and bombardments of civilian zones, as illustrated in Figure 3.50
The Violations Documentation Center, a Syrian civil monitoring group, even reported how the
Russian air campaign in the capital killed at least more than 440 civilians and displaced around
50,000 people.51 According to the group, attacks were frequently indiscriminate with no evident
military target, destroying medical institutions and schools via cluster munitions, incendiary
weapons, and "bunker bursting bombs," among other weapons.52 As a result, migration flows
from Syria peaked in September 2015, when 60,000 asylum applicants came to Europe.53
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Figure 3: Institute Study of War MAP of Russian Airstrikes in Syria (January 29 - February 7, 2016)

b. Political Influence & Propaganda
Now that Russia had helped spark an immigration crisis that overwhelmed the European
Union, the Kremlin saw this immigration crisis as the perfect catalyst for further action. The
Kremlin’s utilization of “weapons of mass migration” was embedded in an increasing rise of
European extreme right wing parties and political figures. The parties share a nativist political
agenda that included ultranationalism, anti-immigration, and populism.54 But their most shared
characteristic is opposition to the current European leaders and existing democratic institutions.55
These movements were distrusful of the lack of unity among EU member states in the outbreak
of the crisis, as well as stoking fear of increasing political and security concerns centererd around
a preconceived notion that refugees are to blame for the enormous spike of crimes and acts of
terrorism. These movements and politicians used these circumstances as incentives to criticize
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the EU’s incompetence in addressing migration challenges. Capitalizing on internal tensions
within the EU member states, Moscow resorted to using migration via propaganda and financial
operations to gain a foothold with the leadership of these movements. Such examples include:
a. Germany
In January 2016, a Russian state-run channel politicized the humanitarian crisis in
Germany by reporting that a 13-year old Russian-German girl had been abducted and gang-raped
by Muslim refugees.56 Although the crime was reported to never have happened by the German
police, this did not stop the Russian government from disseminating the story over social media
and news outlets that consistently offered viewers an alternative view of Germany run by a
depraved, undemocratic and incompetent government unable to deal with the uncontrolled influx
of criminal and terrorist migrants.57 As a result, right-wing populist groups such as Alternative
for Germany (AfD), Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident (PEGIDA),
neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), and the post-communist party Die
Linke who all expressed their distrust of the Merkel administration quickly rose in popularity.
Furthermore, independent Russian-language media outlets in Germany including RT Deutsch
and Sputnik, as well as pro-AfD Twitter accounts,who disseminated this false account left a
profound impact on Germany’s Russian-speaking diaspora of 3,166,000 (3.8% of the country's
population).58 Germany-based Russian sociologist Igor Eidman stated how Russian state media
outlets crafted a sympathetic narrative that exaggerated the negative impact of the refugee crisis
in those communities, causing the majority of German Russians to consider supporting or joining
such parties like the AfD.59 Supporters of the party were vocal in their opposition to Merkel’s
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open-door refugee policy.60 But the most important thing to consider is that one of the party’s
core pledges, besides their nativist stance against immigration, is to lift German sanctions on
Russia and to seek warmer relations with Putin. In response to this show of loyalty, three AfD
parliamentary deputies allegedly received funding of €25,000 ($29,000) from Moscow.61 This
relationship shines another light on Russia’s closeness with the AfD – in 2016 Berlin state
elections where AfD came in second place is the AfD with 17.9% of the first vote and almost
20% of the second vote, as well as going from zero to more than 90 out of 631 seats.62
b. France
Since 2014, France has been plagued by acts of Islamic terrorism and violence, which
became a huge concern. The fear of refugees among the French was instilled in the aftermath of
the November 2015 Paris Attacks.63 This is where Moscow began to befriend some of France's
far-right wing parties as a means to create an anti-immigrant narrative. The Paris attacks gave a
platform to right-wing populist parties such as the National Front (FN) to express their distrust
of the current administration. Aside from its anti-immigration policies, one of the party’s core
pledges is being critical of the EU sanctions imposed against Russia and to support the
establishment of a privileged partnership with Putin.64 President of FN, Marine Le Pen, a staunch
opponent of the EU, has even described Putin as a "defender of the Christian heritage of
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European civilisation,"65 even going so far to praise the Putin regime for accepting fewer refugee
statuses and sharing the party’s view of the EU as “a meddlesome, US-controlled enemy of
national sovereignty and destroyer of traditional religious and family values.”66 In this case,
Russia has sought to generate sympathy among such French electorates by demonstrating that its
“managed sovereign democracy” is a superior model to its European counterparts.67 In return for
their loyalty, the First Czech Russian-Bank, a private entity trusted by Russian elites, allegedly
gave the FN a loan of €9.4 million in September 2014.68 This relationship highlights Russia’s
closeness with the FN as it played a significant financial role in helping the party spread its
campaign during the 2015 French regional elections; the party scored just over 28% of
the first round of ballots and claimed a lead in 6 of 13 regions in mainland France.69
Belarus
I.

Belarus’s Motivations: Lukashenko’s control over “Europe’s Last Dictatorship”
Belarus is a former Soviet republic that declared independence following the end of the

Cold War. Although officially declared a “democratic, social state”, Belarus is categorized by the
Country Report on Human Rights as “an authoritarian state in which elections are orchestrated
and civil liberties are restricted.”70 It is currently run by President Alexander Lukashenko who is
regarded as the "last dictator in Europe''.71 Soon after Lukashenko came into power in 1994, he
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created an autocratic system in order to maintain his regime while minimizing any potential
threats to his rule. In 1996, he passed a referendum on revising amendments of the 1994
constitution that strengthened the power of the presidency72, and further extended his term in
office to 2001.73 This amendment remained intact as he was reelected in 2001 and passed another
referendum in 2004 that allowed him to seek additional terms.74 Under these new amendments,
Lukashenko managed to bestow upon himself the right to be Belarus’s president-for-life.75
A key turning point came at the end of the 2020 Belarussian presidential elections, when
Lukashenko was declared the winner of a sixth term in power, with 80 percent of the vote.76 The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the election.77 This
outcome, along with his overt reputation for electoral fraud in prior elections, triggered one of
Belarus' biggest anti-government protests.From May 2020 to March 2021, tens of thousands of
civilians gathered in protest demanding he President's resignation.78 Lukashenko responded by
officially launching a "unprecedented and systemic" state-led campaign of human rights breaches
to silence those he sees as a security threat, according to the UN's Special Rapporteur.79
Lukashenko passed legislation into law on May 17, 2021, allowing law enforcement agents to
use weapons and military equipment to physically attack demonstrators.80 This bill was part of a
larger effort to limit civil liberties and information access.81 As a result, the government has
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jailed over 35,000 individuals, with 887 people currently being held as political prisoners.82
The European Union has resisted the Lukashenko regime's attempts, as it has resisted
Putin's. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and
European Council President Charles Michel said that the EU will penalize a significant number
of Belarusian officials for "violence, repression, and electoral fraud." These events marked a new
low point in Belarus-EU relations In May 2021, Lukashenko responded to these proposals by
threatening the EU, saying that he would “allow migrants and drugs to flood into Europe by no
longer taking action to prevent illegal crossings across the border in his country.”83
II.

Belarus’s Objectives: 2021 Belarus-European Union Migrant Crisis
The 2021 Belarus–European Union border crisis involves a significantly increased

movement of tens of thousands of immigrants who are pouring into Lithuania, Latvia, and
Poland via their borders with neighboring Belarus (as shown in Figure 3).84 In contrast to the
2015-16 European migrant crisis, this one comprises mainly Iraqi Kurds, Iraqi Arabs, Syrians,
and Yemenites.85 Furthermore, the majority of them originated from the Kurdistan Region where
they were forced to flee the violent conflict between Kurdish resistance fighters and ISIL since
the Syrian Civil War86 Although this conflict was mainly political, they were also attracted to
Germany's open-door policy due to scarce economic resources in the region.
Although the crisis initially began in July, it became a serious issue in October when an
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estimated 20,000 migrants and asylum seekers were present in Belarus alongside 5,000 migrants
who remained stuck on the Poland-Belarus border.87 Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, all of them
being EU member states, responded by accusing the Lukashenko regime of facilitating the entry
of migrants into these countries. In this respect, it should be discussed whether the migration
flows could be part of Belarus’s strategy of weakening the status of the EU asylum policies.
While the dictatorship continues to deny these instances, it is important to recognize that there is
evidence that Belarus is using the refugee issue to gain leverage against the EU.
III.

How Migration is Weaponized by the Lukashenko Regime
Belarus’s strategy is almost akin to that of the Putin regime: (1) to exploit the inherent

weaknesses within the European Union over uncontrolled migration; and (2) to legitimize
Lukashenko’s presidential elections in 2020 and to lift the EU sanctions. The main distinction
between the Putin regime and Lukashenko regime is that the latter selectively targeted Poland,
Latvia, and Lithuania, all of them being EU member states, rather than the union as a whole.
Similar to the Kremlin’s active measures, the Lukashenko regime weaponizes migrants and
refugees by means of non-conventional elements of “hybrid warfare”, a framework consisting of
irregular warfare and cyberwarfare alongside other influencing methods, such as disinformation,
lawfare, political destabilization campaigns, and so forth.88 Such examples are as follows:
a. Coordination with Flight Agencies
The Lukashenko regime prioritizes and actively organizes a campaign to invite refugees
from the Middle East to come to Belarus and take them to the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and
from the Middle East to come to Belarus and take them to the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and
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Figure 4: Refugee routes via Belarus to the European Union (Deutsche Welle)

Latvia.89 In July 2021, when the migration crisis received minimal to no attention, Belarussian
tourism companies began collaborating with local airlines operating in the Middle East, notably
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.90 As shown in Figure 4, migrants and refugees were provided
one-way tours to Minsk, the capital of Belarus.91 The number of direct flights include
Baghdad—Minsk operated by Iraqi Airways, Fly Baghdad, and Jood Land; Istanbul—Minsk
flight operated by the Turkish Airlines; and Damascus—Minsk operated by the Syrian Cham
Wings Airlines.92 These travel agencies were linked to its Belarusian counterparts, such as
Belavia, Umno Tury, Oskartur, and Tsentr Kurort. All of them are directly administered and
overseen by the Ministry of Sport and Tourism of the Republic of Belarus.93 A challenger,
according to Greenhill, seeks not only to destabilize a target administration via the use of
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migrants, but to also create influence and perceived legitimacy among the migrants.94 Minsk is
not the ultimate destination for the refugees; they were attempting to migrate to Germany. In this
case, Belarussian travel agencies seemed to provide a safe passage to unsuspecting refugees
whose main objective is to head to Germany by providing a list of seven-day package tours
consisting of “non-refundable one-way air tickets, insurance, hotel accommodation and
excursions.”95 The Belarussian government also loosened the tourist visa procedures for Iraqi
citizens, allowing them to easily secure a seven-day residence in Minsk.96 The major downside
is the price of the tourist visa migrants which cost somewhere between USD 2,000 and $14,000
per person, roughly thirteen times more than its initial price of $90.97 These procedures were

Figure 5: Volunteers of InformNapalm international intelligence community noticed that the private Syrian
airline Cham Wings Airlines has operated 4 direct flights from Damascus International Airport to Minsk.
The peak of flying was observed on November 7, 2021
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implemented to easily facilitate the movement of migrants and refugees by providing them
attractive incentives with the hopes of amassing revenues for the Belarussian economy.98 As
such, the majority of the migrants paid somewhere between $14,000 to $17,000.99 In spite of the
cost, the flights to Belarus were considered to be the most convenient route to get to Europe.
b. Political Destabilization
The spread of violence across borders, which occurs when the underlying conflict
extends from migrant-sending nations to migrant-receiving countries, is the worst case scenario
for any humanitarian disaster. Poland is an excellent example of a migrant-receiving nation that
has suffered from Lukashenko's "weapons of mass migration" among the EU member states
participating in the border problem. Due to the increasing number of refugees crossing the
Kuznica-Bruzgi border, Polish President Andrzej Duda accused the Lukashenko administration
of weaponizing migrants (as shown in Figure 5).100 As the number of migrants present at the
border increases, member states will have to follow EU standard law in upholding responsibility
of admitting and integrating the population. On the other hand, Warsaw reversed this duty by
declaring a state of emergency at the request of the Council of Ministers of Poland.101 One of the
goals of the state of emergency was to legalize the policy of “pushback”, a term that refers to "a
series of governmental policies that will send refugees and migrants back across a border without
Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak authorized the deployment of more than 900 troops
of the Polish Army to support the Border Guard, the state security agency tasked with patrolling
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Figure 5: Agence France-Presse Mapping of Belarus-Poland border crossings

the border, to push back any migrants who attempt to enter Poland back to Belarus.102 Human
rights groups such as Amnesty International reported evidence of Polish soldiers enforcing police
violence by means of tear gas, stun grenades, and water cannons.103 Other amendments of the
policy include the action of temporarily closing the railway checkpoint in Kuznica, limiting the
freedom of assembly, as well as restricting human rights activists and journalists from reporting
the crisis.104 The European Court of Human Rights has charged Poland's Constitutional Tribunal,
the government's judicial body in charge of supervising laws, as a result of this occurrence.105
Poland infringed on Protocol 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which forbids
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"collective pushbacks of migrants and refugees alike."106 The Constitutional Tribunal was also
convicted of violating specific protections in the 1951 Convention prohibiting the expulsion of
refugees,107 and “the principle of non-refoulement”.108 This disregard for EU legislation poses a
problem for both Poland, individually, and Europe as a whole, as its recent actions illustrate not
only the shifting view of the target's inability to cope with an inflow, but also the union's political
divisiveness.
VII.

Analysis
This section illustrates the similarities and differences in the motivations, objectives, and

different types of mechanisms that the two countries use when resorting to "weapons of mass
migration" by discussing their efforts in the 2015 European migrant crisis and the 2021
Belarus-European Union border crisis. Russia’s involvement in the crisis was the most recent
example of a time in which human migration could possibly become a weapon for countries to
achieve political and economic ends. This model also serves best for Belarus, an authoritarian
regime that is possibly using a similar playbook to that of the Putin regime in facilitating the
displacement of migrants. For the purpose of this research assessment, we will study Russia's
and Belarus's situation in reference to their involvement in the migration crisis. We will then be
able to confirm if Russia and Belarus are weaponizing migrants, and if so, to what extent they
have been successful in doing so to achieve their objectives.
Both the Putin regime and the Lukashenko regime have the same historical motivations
and comparable objectives. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both regimes have been
characterized by authoritarianism in the eyes of Western states and institutions. The two regimes'
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current aim is to prevent any disturbance in the status quo, which would contribute to sustaining
their regime and achieving their objectives. However, there is one main distinction between the
two regimes. The Kremlin, on one hand, sought to expand geographically by incorporating
neighboring states and European countries. Hence, the Putin regime’s motivations for retaliating
against the European Union are primarily geopolitically driven. The Lukashenko regime has
desperately sought to maintain a stronger handle on its domestic affairs. As such, the regime’s
motivations for weaponizing migrants are politically driven as Lukashenko has sought to ensure
that his leadership continues without any forms of interruption. In both situations, one can say
that their motivation is also economically driven since both regimes’ ambitions have been
temporarily disrupted by sanctions imposed on them by the European Union. As such, they are
potentially treating migration both as a political instrument designed to destabilize the EU from
within and as leverage to force the EU to reverse its economic sanctions.
A continuation of the regimes’ similarities is their use of military, political, and/or
economic measures. First and foremost, the two regimes’ weaponization of migration fits under
the propaganda variant. Both regimes utilized technological outreach to either incite political
polarization in European countries. In Russia’s case, the outbreak of right-wing parties and
politicians amid the humanitarian crisis was influenced by the Russian government’s ability to
make full use of its national and international television broadcasts within EU member states. As
shown in Germany and France, the Kremlin not only framed migrants and refugees, but to
treated them as a result of the European Union’s own incompetence to handle the humanitarian
crisis. As such, the Kremlin targeted right-wing parties who oppose the current administration
and are sympathetic to the Russian state, driving a major wedge within the EU in the process.
Although Lukashenko’s Belarus was not in the same position of total control as the
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Kremlin, the regime’s use of disinformation embedded in-flight agencies were specifically
targeting the migrants and refugees themselves rather than European populations. In the first
step, false or misleading content was created by Belarusian state-owned travel agencies with the
cooperation of Middle Eastern counterparts. Second, force multipliers, such as travel packages
and tourist visas, were disseminated by the Belarusian government, adding legitimacy to the
migrant journey. But regardless of the difference, both created a similar level of disinformation
by endorsing a problem definition or causal interpretation of their respective migration situation.
This method also falls under the economic variant. More and more migrants were relocating to
Minsk once the regime began to open up these travel opportunities. When they couldn't access
legitimate migration channels, the Lukashenko administration took advantage of a significant
number of migrants prepared to incur risks in quest of a better life. As a result, migrants are at
risk of being exploited economically; one might call this action a smuggling endeavor.
Secondly, the two regimes’ weaponization of migrants fall under the exportive variant.
Russia, on one hand, attempted to influence the European population most by conducting certain
political influence activities across certain countries. As evident in Germany and France, these
influence activities were attributed to Russian strategic objectives: predominance outside of
Russia and world-power status for Russia. The major objective of Russian influence activities
was to weaken the EU. In the shorter term, it is to lift the sanctions imposed by the EU after the
Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014.109 As shown in the case study, the Kremlin has been
able to target the West through a divide and rule approach, primarily using financial and
technological means.110 For example, the Lisa F. case in Germany allowed Russia to appeal the
incapability of the German government to the Russian-speaking German diaspora, encouraging
109

Karlsen, G.H. Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe. Palgrave
Commun 5, 19 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0227-8
110
Ibid.

